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equation, and find wage elasticities that are considerably higher than reported in other available 
studies. 
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Abstract 
Physicians are key personnel in a sector which is important due to its size as well as the quality of 
service it provides. We estimate the labor supply of physicians employed at hospitals in Norway, using 
personnel register data merged with other public records. A dynamic labor supply equation is 
estimated using a sample of 1303 physicians  observed over the period 1993–97. The methods of 
estimation are GMM and system GMM. We reject the static model in favor of a dynamic model and 
obtain a long-run wage elasticity of about 0.55. This is considerably higher than previously estimated 
for physicians, in particular for those who are not self-employed. 
 
 
JEL Classification: I10, J22, J44. 
Keywords: Physicians, labor supply, dynamic panel data. 
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Sammendrag 
Leger er nøkkelpersonell i helsesektoren og følgelig sentrale i forhold til å sikre et tilstrekkelig tilbud av 
helsetjenester. Gitt en knapphet på leger er det derfor av stor betydning å studere hvordan endringer i 
legenes lønn påvirker arbeidstilbudet. I denne artikkelen estimerer vi arbeidstilbudet til leger ansatt på 
norske sykehus. Data er hentet fra et lønns- og personell register (PAI), koblet med data fra SSB. Fra 
disse dataene bruker vi et utvalget bestående av 1303 leger som vi observerer fra 1993–1997. Vi 
estimerer dynamiske paneldata modeller (GMM og system-GMM), og avviser en statisk modell til 
fordel for den dynamiske. Resultatene indikerer en langsiktig lønnselastisitet på 0.55, noe som er 
betydelig høyere enn tidligere estimater av legenes lønnselastisitet. 
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Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the labor supply of physicians in Norway. Thus we provide 
insight into the behavior of key personnel in a sector that is important due to the quality of service it 
provides, as well as the fraction of GDP that is spent on health expenditures. There are relatively few 
studies of the labor market fo r the medical profession, and those that exist tend to focus on physicians 
in private practice. Our addition to previous research is a study of the labor supply of physicians 
employed by Norwegian hospitals. Besides its relevance for labor markets in the health sector per se, a 
study of physicians may provide insight into the behavior of high-income employees in general. 
A significant amount of the research on physician behavior relates to physician-induced demand for 
services, e.g., Hay and Leahy (1982), Headen (1990), McGuire and Pauly (1991). There is also a 
literature on physician practice patterns, including Gaynor and Pauly (1990), Lee (1990), Ferrall et al. 
(1998). The relatively few papers on supply include Sloan (1975) and Noether (1986). A relatively 
recent application is Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994), who focus on the impact of wage and non-wage 
income for a sample of self-employed US physicians. They find an uncompensated wage elasticity for 
male doctors of 0.23, with a compensated substitution elasticity of 0.44. Showalter and Thurston 
(1997) focus on tax effects on labor supply for physicians, as an example of the response of high-
income individuals. A key finding is that self-employed physicians are sensitive to the marginal tax 
rate, with a supply elasticity of 0.33, whereas the effect is small and insignificant for employee 
physicians. 
In this study we estimate the labor supply of 1303 physicians employed at Norwegian hospitals over a 
five-year period: 1993–97. The data are constructed by combining information on wages and hours 
worked from a personnel register with administrative individual information. We focus on labor 
supply conditional on working. Even though the strongest effect of wages are at the extensive margin 
(Heckman 1993), this may be less of an issue for physicians.1  Since physicians belong to the group of 
high-income individuals, the question remains whether there is a positive labor supply response to 
wage increases at all, or if the income effect dominates the substitution effect. As noted above, 
previous results find that the wage elasticities of physicians who are not self-employed are modest. 
The general literature on labor supply is vast. In their recent overview, Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) 
point out that some confusion exists as to what kind of wage elasticities are estimated when different 
studies are compared – the researcher should be explicit as to whether inter- or intratemporal 
substitution effects are modeled. Following the seminal work by Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and 
MaCurdy (1981), a branch of the labor supply literature has developed which considers life cycle 
effects. Estimation of life cycle models is facilitated by the availability of panel data, see the survey in 
Laisney et al. (1996). The purpose of this study is not to estimate a full life cycle labor supply model; 
specifically we do not consider intertemporal substitution effects. Having access to panel data, we 
formulate a model that does not require myopic agents, and therefore uses a framework that is 
consistent with a life cycle model. 
                                                                 
1 In a companion paper, Askildsen et al. (2002), nurses’ labor supply is estimated using data from the same sources, with a focus 
on the selectivity that follows from participation decisions. 
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We proceed with an account of relevant features of the Norwegian health sector and health labor 
markets in the next section. Section 3 describes our empirical approach, while Section 4 gives an 
overview of the data. Section 5 presents our results and Section 6 concludes. 
Background 
At $2362 per capita in 2000, Norwegian total health expenditures are above the OECD average 
($1967), but way below the US ($4631) and Switzerland ($3222). The health sector is predominantly 
public,  with governmental expenditures in 2000 amounting to 85.2%, as compared to the OECD 
average of 71.5%. Despite the expenditure level, the physician density (2.7 per 1000 in 1998) is at the 
OECD average, a fact that may be partly explained by the cost driving effects of a scattered 
population.2 
With few exceptions, Norwegian hospitals are owned and run by the public authorities, typically by 
counties. However, a recent (2002) reform transferred ownership of all publicly owned hospitals to 
the central government. An important exception are two large hospitals in the capital, Oslo. These 
hospitals were run by the central government before 2002. In the Norwegian nomenclature, hospitals 
are grouped according to functions and responsibilities. Local hospitals with chirurgical, medical, and 
gynecological wards; County hospitals (the term refers to functions and not to ownership) with more 
specialties, e.g. neurological wards; and «Central hospitals» with a longer list of capacities. Finally, there 
are five «regional hospitals» with the highest level of specialties, including one in Oslo owned by the 
central government. 
Centralized negotiations and powerful unions characterize the Norwegian labor market. This is also 
the case for physicians, who are represented by The Norwegian Medical Association, whose members 
include 94% of the physician population. As of 2002, about 55% of Norwegian physicians were 
employed by hospitals. Self-employed physicians are largely dependent on National Insurance 
reimbursements, which are negotiated centrally, as are the tariffs for physicians employed by hospitals 
or other public services. Still there is room for local variation among hospitals, for example in the 
scheduling of overtime work. Until the reform in 2002 which transferred ownership to the central 
government, the physicians’ association’s main counterpart in wage negotiations pertaining to 
hospitals was The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities. In addition, wages for 
those employed by the state were negotiated with representatives for the central authorities. At the 
local level, physicians follow schedules that typically involve a certain amount of «extended hours», i.e. 
the work schedule involves more than «normal» hours per week, with compensation. This «planned 
over-time» varies across hospitals and is not necessarily renegotiated when the central tariffs change. 
In addition, there may be demand for over-time due to vacancies, sick -absence etc. Thus, even though 
hospital physicians are public servants, there is variation in wages as well as in hours demanded and 
supplied. 
Econometric approach  
E c o n o m i c  m o d e l  
We formulate a labor supply equation that is consistent with a life cycle model, where the period labor 
supply is the outcome of a two-stage budgeting process, see Blundell and MaCurdy (1999), Blundell 
                                                                 
2 Source: OECD Health Statistics, http://www.oecd.org. It should be noted that according to the Norwegian Medical Association, 
the OECD estimate of Norwegian physician density is too low. 
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and Walker (1986).3 Assume that physicians have period t utility functions, u(ct, lt, Y t) over a composite 
consumption good (ct, the numeraire) and leisure (lt). Y t is a vector of «taste shifter» characteristics that 
may affect consumption decisions. Physicians maximize the life time sum of discounted utility subject 
to period t budget constraints 
1) t
n
ttttt sywlwc -+=+ t , 
 
where w denotes the wage rate, t is the time constraint, s is net saving, and yn is non-labor income, net 
of asset income. Letting At  denote period t assets (as measured at the end of the period) and rt period t 
interest rate, savings are given by  
 
2) .)1( 1-+-= tttt ArAs  
 
In the first stage of the maximization, wealth is allocated over the life cycle to keep the marginal utility 
of wealth constant. In the second stage, for each period t utility is maximized subject to current prices 
and the wealth (full income) allocated to that period in the first stage. This gives period t labor supply 
(ht º t – lt) as ),,( tttt ?Ywhh = , where t
n
tt syY -= . In the empirical specification we use a 
frequently applied formulation, 
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It is easy to verify, by using Roy’s identity, that (3) is consistent with the additive indirect utility 
function  
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Equation (3) is the uncompensated (Marshallian) labor supply function, and a is the wage elasticity. 
Using the Slutsky equation, the income compensated (Hicksian) response to a wage change may be 
derived as )( twt hh t j
a - . Standard consumer theory places no restrictions on a, but implies that 
Hicksian supply be non-negative (i.e., that the demand for leisure be non-positive) in the wage rate. 
This condition holds if tthwja ³ .  
E c o n o m e t r i c  s p e c i f i c a t i o n  a n d  e s t i m a t i o n  
In the econometric specification we introduce individual subscripts and allow for unobservables by 
writing itiitit X? embh ++= , where Xit are observable characteristics. mi   is an individual 
specific effect and may be correlated with Xit and/or Yit. The remainder eit is assumed to be white 
noise. As noted in Section 2, wages are negotiated centrally each year but that does not necessarily 
mean that a physician is able to adjust his work schedule immediately following a wage change. We 
incorporate this element in the model by assuming that physician i’s desired supply of hours is given by 
(3), denoted by an asterisk. In natural logs, 
                                                                 
3 An alternative approach is to model marginal-utility -of-wealth-constant (Frisch) labor supply, see MaCurdy (1981) and MaCurdy 
and Blundell (1999). 
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5) itiitititit XYwh embjab +++++= lnln 0
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We then impose a simple partial adjustment mechanism, 
 
6) 10),ln(lnlnln 1,
*
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where a lack of asterisk indicates realized hours. Combining (5) and (6) gives the estimable equation 
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with ititii ef qeqmqjjqaaqbbqg =====-= ,,
~,~,
~
,1 00 . The parameters of (5) are 
easily recovered by dividing gbja -1by  
~
 and ,~,~ . We also note that a «standard» model with all 
adjustment taking place within each period is nested in our set-up. This corresponds to the case where 
g = 0, and is a testable hypothesis. 
For estimation, we note that Yit includes Ait, which is an outcome of the choice process and is 
therefore endogenous. Previous values are predetermined and are therefore valid instruments. If y itn 
includes spouse income (as it will in this application), presumably the couple’s labor supply decisions 
are not independent.  Then this element is endogenous, too, and must be instrumented.4 Due to the 
way the data are constructed, wage is also endogenous. Equation (7) is a dynamic linear panel data 
model and may be estimated by GMM-methods that have now become standard. First, the equation is 
first-differenced to get rid of the fixed effect f i, which may be correlated with some of the right hand 
side variables. With T time periods, the estimating equation becomes  
 
8) TteXYwhh itititittiit ,...,2,
~~ln~lnln 1, =D+D+D+D+D=D - bjag , 
 
where D is the difference operator: Dlnh i,t = lnh i,t – lnhi,t-1 etc. In this equation, Dlnh i,t-1 = lnh i,t-1 - 
lnh i,t-2 is correlated with Deit = eit - ei,t-1, but lnh i,t-s and Dlnh i,t-s are uncorrelated with Deit and are valid 
instruments for s ³ 2 (serial correlation has been ruled out by assumption).  
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) GMM estimator, which will be employed here, exploits all possible 
moment restrictions in levels for each period t ³ 3. The number of available restrictions increases with 
t:  
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The validity of the over-identifying restrictions may be tested using a Sargan test. If the eit (and thus eit) 
are serially uncorrelated, then the residuals in the first-differenced model are first-order-correlated, but 
should not show any second-order serial correlation. These restrictions may be tested, see Arellano 
and Bond (1991). More recently, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) show that 
                                                                 
4 In the estimation, the elements of Yit will be entered as separate variables. 
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the efficiency of the Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM estimator may be dramatically improved by 
using an extended system GMM estimator that uses lagged differences as instruments for equations in 
levels, in addition to lagged levels of the instruments for equations in first differences. In this paper, 
we report both the «ordinary» GMM and «system» GMM results.  
Data an d variables 
Our main data source is a personnel register administered by the Norwegian Association of Local and 
Regional Authorities (NALRA), providing individual specific wage and hours information on public 
servants employed by counties or municipalities . Thus employees of the main bulk of hospitals 
(county-owned) are represented. The NALRA data have been merged with individual specific as well 
as hospital specific information from Statistics Norway. The data sources are public registers, e.g. 
wealth data are extracted from tax records. 
Sixty four hospitals report information to the NALRA register. This is the majority of Norwegian 
hospitals, the most important exceptions being the National Hospital  (Rikshospitalet) and the 
National Cancer Hospital (Radiumhospitalet), both run by the central government. However, some 
hospitals did not report sufficiently detailed hours information to the register for some (12 hospitals) 
or all (12 hospitals) the years in the analysis period, 1993–1997. Thus 40 hospitals are represented in 
the sample. We restrict the sample to male physicians less than 67 years of age, who worked at one of 
these hospitals for at least three consecutive years – the last requirement is necessary for first-
differencing and instrumenting. The final sample then includes 1303 physicians.5  
(Table 1 about here) 
The variables used in the analysis are the empirical counterparts to lnh it, lnwit, sit, y it, and Xit, and are 
defined more concisely in Table 1. The specification of Xit contains family information, and also job 
and hospital characteristics. In addition to the exclusion restrictions discussed in the previous section, 
experience and two demand related variables (hospital occupancy rate and average hospitalization 
time) are used as instruments. Details regarding the construction of wage and hours variables can be 
found in the appendix. It should be noted that the wage and hours data in the NALRA register are 
collected in October each year, whereas other individual characteristics are observed yearly, and 
hospital characteristics are yearly averages.  
(Table 2 about here) 
Sample statistics for each year are reported in Table 2. The mean age is about 46.7 years in 1993 and 
about 49.5 years in 1997, reflecting that the panel is unbalanced. The marriage rate is relatively stable 
(about 82 percent) over the five years, while the proportion with children less than three years of age 
varied from 10 to 15 percent. The average number of hours worked per month decreased from 181.5 
in 1994 to 172.1 in 1996. We also note that the average wage rate increased sharply in 1996, following 
a particularly favorable settlement for physicians employed at hospitals in the central negotiations. 
Non-labor income (mostly spouse earnings) has increased steadily over the sample period from 137.5 
thousand NoK in 1993 to 162.0 thousand NoK in 1997. Net wealth has also increased steadily over 
the sample period from 82.4 thousand NoK in 1993 to 247.7 thousand NoK in 1997. These 
physicians had an average of 20 to 23 years of experience over the sample period. Sixty one to sixty 
three percent of these were consultant physicians, while 18 to 24 percent of them were chief 
consultant physicians. Sixty two to sixty seven percent of the hospitals were central hospitals, while 17 
to 18 percent were county hospitals. The occupancy rate varied between 86 and 89, while the total 
                                                                 
5 It is well established that there are gender differences in labor market behavior. We only have data on 378 female physicians. 
Regressions based on this sub-sample yielded imprecise results, and we have chosen to focus on the sample of males in this 
paper. 
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number of hospital beds varied between 367 and 407. The average length of stay varied between 300 
and 314.  
Regression results 
(Table 3 about here) 
Table 3 presents results for the dynamic labor supply equation. The Arellano-Bond (1991) GMM 
estimator and the Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM system estimator are reported.6 Columns 1–2 
of Table 3 report the GMM results without external instruments, while columns 3–4 report the GMM 
results using the additional instruments described in the data section and at the bottom of Table 3. 
The reported standard errors have the finite sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2000) to deal 
with the potential finite sample bias of GMM. The reader is reminded that in our specification, the 
wage coefficients are elasticities, and that all the coefficients are short run.  
We first note that the specification tests are satisfactory. The tests regarding serial correlation reject 
the absence of first order, but not second order serial correlation, and the Sargan tests do not reject 
the over-identifying restrictions. The system GMM results in columns (2) and (4) are quite similar, 
both rejecting that the lagged hours coefficient is zero. We interpret this as a rejection of a static 
model in favor of a dynamic model. 
The short run wage elasticities using the system GMM estimator are in the 0.303 and 0.342 range. 
These are on the high end when compared to previous cross-section results for physicians labor 
supply. The corresponding long run wage elasticities for system GMM are 0.55 and 0.58, with 
standard errors 0.20 and 0.15, respectively. Savings and other income are not significant for all GMM 
estimators. Consultant and chief physicians work less than the reference group. This is also the case 
for physicians with small children, indicating that family responsibilities may play a role even for male 
physicians. Doctors employed at large hospitals (measured by number of beds) work more than 
others, but that effect is partly offset by the negative effect of working at a regional hospital as 
compared to the reference group of smaller local hospitals. We also note the negative constant term, 
which in a differenced model implies a negative time trend. Thus the positive wage effect at the 
individual level is compatible with the negative trend in aggregate hours seen in Table 2. 
A possible objection to our modeling might be that taxes are nor taken explicitly into consideration. 
However, with wages measured in logs, the effect of a constant marginal tax is picked up by the 
constant term. Individual differences in the tax rate that are fixed over  time are swept away by first-
differencing, along with the constant term. Moreover, most physicians in our sample have a yearly 
income implying the highest marginal tax rate (about 59%) for all years 7. Since there has been no 
change in the relevant tax rates during this period, the marginal tax rate is constant for most 
physicians over the sample period. Excluding physicians with yearly income implying lower tax rates 
for some years had practically no effect on the estimated wage elasticities. 
Even though the institutional setting is different, a comparison to Rizzo and Blumenthal (1994) and 
Showalter and Thurston (1997) seems relevant. Both these studies find considerably lower wage 
elasticities than those reported here. Using the same functional form as in the present study, Rizzo 
and Blumenthal, who consider self-employed physicians, find an uncompensated wage elasticity for 
men of 0.23, and an income compensated elasticity of 0.44. Somewhat surprisingly, we do not find any 
                                                                 
6 The results were obtained using code written by Doornik et al. (2001) in the Ox language, see Doornik (1999).  
7 Only 37 physicians had yearly incomes corresponding to marginal tax rates lower than 59 percent. 4 physicians had lower 
marginal tax rates for all years, 19 physicians only the first year, while 8 physicians had lower marginal tax rates only for the last 
year. 
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statistically significant income effects. Hence, we do not compute the income compensated elasticities. 
The lack of significance could be due to too little variation over time, but could also reflect differences 
between self-employed and employee physicians. Showalter and Thurston focus on responses to 
variations in marginal tax rather than wage elasticities per se, but a key finding is that whereas self-
employed physicians are sensitive to the marginal tax rate, employee physicians have no discernible 
sensitivity at all. The according wage elasticities are 0.33 and 0.10, respectively. 8One reason that we 
estimate elasticities closer to 0.6 could be that the work schedules possibly are more flexible for the 
employee physicians in our sample. We have also estimated a static model (not reported) which is 
rejected by our dynamic specification. In this model the estimated wage elasticity (0.25) was closer to 
those reported in previous studies. Thus it cannot be ruled out that our higher estimated elasticities 
are not only resulting from institutional differences, but also from our access to panel data that allows 
for a richer dynamic specification. 
Concluding remarks 
The literature on the behavior of physicians holding jobs at hospitals is scarce. In this study we have 
estimated the labor supply of Norwegian hospital physicians, who constitute a majority of the 
profession in that country. We have used a matched panel data set which we think provide fairly 
accurate information on wages and hours. Simply stated, our main conclusion is that physicians who 
work at hospitals behave similarly to other employees. Compared to previous findings, the physicians 
in our sample seem fairly responsive to wage changes. In part, this may result from the institutional 
setting: these physicians are ordinary wage earners, and their earnings – even though they clearly are in 
the upper part of the wage distribution – are lower than for many self-employed doctors. Thus they 
need not be anywhere near the backward-bending part of the labor supply curve. But having access to 
panel data and being able to control for unobserved heterogeneity, as well as estimating a dynamic 
model, may explain why our wage elasticity estimates differ from the previous cross-section estimates. 
For planners of public policy, our results are interesting from at least two perspectives. First, if 
physician services are in short supply, physicians actually do respond to wage increases. Second, if 
increasing health expenditures are a worry, policymakers should be aware that the fiscal effect of 
increasing physicians’ wages might be magnified by the labor supply response.  
 
                                                                 
8 The elasticities are with respect to (1-marginal tax rate) but in their formulation the wage elasticity is identical. 
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D a t a  a p p e n d i x  
In this appendix we explain how wages, hours and savings are constructed. The total number of hours 
supplied by each physician is not directly reported in our data (the NALRA register). The amount of 
regular hours is given, while work outside normal hours have to be calculated on the basis of different 
overtime payments. Our data contains information on the total sum of two types of overtime 
compensation: compensation for planned (contractual) overtime (fixed overtime compensation) and 
compensation for ordinary overtime (variable overtime compensation). Ordinary overtime is typically 
used due to vacancies and sick-absence. Before 1996, compensation for this kind of overtime was the 
same irrespective of working hours. Assistant physicians received 100 % overtime bonus, while ward 
and leading physicians received only 50 %. Since 1996, all physicians received 100 percent 
compensation for the first 11 hours per week and 200 percent compensation for additional overtime 
(here additional overtime include both planned and ordinary overtime). Using the total amount of 
overtime payments and the hourly compensation, it is straightforward to calculate the number of 
ordinary overtime hours.  
In addition to ordinary overtime, physicians can make an agreement with the hospital to set an 
amount of hours that the physician is required to supply. Before 1996 the physicians were 
compensated at a fixed rate for this kind of contractual overtime. From 1996 the overtime bonus was 
made dependent on the amount of hours offered. The physicians receive 50 percent compensation for 
the first five hours per week, 100 percent from 6 to 11 hours and 200 percent compensation for more 
than 11 hours per week. Knowing the exact amount each physician receives as fixed overtime pay 
makes it a straightforward task to calculate the number of planed overtime hours worked. However, 
the amount reported in our data could include other kinds of regular compensation as well. Typically 
this is compensation for other types of extended working hours (like meetings or administrative work 
outside normal hours) and this overtime might be compensated differently compared to what we have 
called planned overtime. Since we only have the total amount of fixed overtime payments, and 
therefore are unable to single out different types of overtime, we treat all overtime in the same way. 
To the extent that this possible measurement error is individual specific, first differencing eliminates 
it.  
The hourly wage is calculated by adding the monthly basic income, compensation for ordinary and 
contractual overtime, and then dividing this income by the total number of hours worked. Finally the 
wage is discounted by a price index.  
Physicians engaged in shift work have a contractual regular working hours of 35.5 hours per week, 
whereas others work 37.5 hours per week. To correct for this we have included a dummy variable 
(Hour35.5) in the regressions that takes the value 1 if the physician is on a contract implying 35.5 
hours per week, 0 otherwise. 
Saving is constructed as net family wealth (wealth of the physician and his wife) at time (t) minus net 
family wealth at time (t-1). Information on net wealth is taken from public tax registers, and includes 
real estate, bonds, shares, options and other securities, checking accounts, savings and deposits 
accounts, personal loans, credits, etc. Net wealth might be undervalued, since the taxable value of real 
estate is considerably lower than the marked value. Assuming that the under valuation of net wealth is 
constant over this short time span, first differencing eliminates this problem. 
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Table 1  Variable definitions 
Lnh Log of monthly hours 
Lnw Log of hourly wage 
Saving Net wealth of physician and spouse (t) – net wealth of physician and spouse 
(t-1) 
Other income Spouse income + child benefits 
Hour35.5 Dummy=1 if the physician is on a contract implying 35.5 hours per week, 0 
otherwise 
Experience Years with income above basic counting unit in pension system (NoK 37033 in 
1993) 
Length of stay Total inpatients days/number of patients (in 100) 
Occupancy rate  Total inpatient days*100/effective beds*365  
Hospital beds Total number of beds set-up and staffed for use (in 100) 
Central hospital Dummy=1 if working at central or regional hospital, 0 otherwise 
County hospital Dummy=1 if working in a county hospital, 0 otherwise 
Chief consultant physician Dummy=1 if chief consultant physician, 0 otherwise 
Consultant physician Dummy=1 if consultant physician, 0 otherwise 
Married Dummy=1 if married, 0 otherwise 
Children<3 Dummy=1 if having children less than 3 years of age, 0 otherwise 
 
   
Table 2  Descriptive statistics 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Hours per month 180.75 (24.42) 181.49 (25.26) 176.08 (30.06) 172.06 (29.47) 173.52 (33.34) 
Hourly wage 186.29 (21.77) 187.42 (28.45) 191.49 (31.79) 220.89 (39.64) 220.71 (34.34) 
Other income (1000 NoK) 137.47 (115.47) 138.29 (118.03) 145.86 (120.93) 156.69 (131.05) 161.98 (142.58) 
Net wealth (1000 NoK) 82.35 (1114.13) 127.35 (1932.54) 179.87 (2153.63) 194.66 (2396.23) 247.66 (2628.01) 
Savings (1000 NoK) - 2.23 (48.94) 6.58 (43.25) 5.03 (34.73) 3.60 (36.42) 
Hour35.5 0.73 (0.44) 0.72 (0.45) 0.71 (0.46) 0.68 (0.47) 0.67 (0.47) 
Experience 20.53 (6.11) 20.81 (6.43) 21.28 (6.83) 22.29 (8.77) 23.42 (6.78) 
Age 46.67 (8.55) 46.87 (8.70) 47.34 (8.96) 48.34 (8.77) 49.47 (8.59) 
Married 0.82 (0.38) 0.82 (0.39) 0.81 (0.39) 0.82 (0.38) 0.82 (0.39) 
Children < 3 0.15 (0.36) 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.33) 0.11 (0.32) 0.10 (0.30) 
Consultant physician 0.61 (0.49) 0.61 (0.49) 0.62 (0.49) 0.65 (0.48) 0.63 (0.48) 
Chief consultant physician 0.20 (0.40) 0.18 (0.39) 0.18 (0.39) 0.19 (0.39) 0.24 (0.43) 
Central hospital 0.62 (0.49) 0.63 (0.48) 0.64 (0.48) 0.65 (0.48) 0.67 (0.47) 
County hospital 0.18 (0.38) 0.18 (0.38) 0.17 (0.37) 0.18 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 
Occupancy rate  88.91 (8.59) 86.63 (9.03) 87.83 (8.49) 87.83 (8.55) 87.56 (9.52) 
Hospital beds 367.46 (255.21) 385.88 (272.07) 402.53 (283.97) 406.74 (277.77) 401.59 (259.02) 
Length of stay 299.93 (30.47) 304.39 (31.71) 302.17 (27.79) 307.81 (32.53) 314.19 (33.67) 
Number of observations 1028 1216 1304 1105 995 
   
Table 3  Labor supply estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
                   GMM                GMM-SYS                  GMM                GMM-SYS 
 Coef Std.Error Coef Std.Error Coef Std.Error Coef Std.Error 
Lnh(-1) 0.238 0.167 0.450*** 0.078 0.179 0.156 0.408*** 0.073 
Lnw 0.390* 0.203 0.303*** 0.099 0.543*** 0.186 0.342*** 0.093 
Saving -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Other income -0.007 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 
Hour_35.5 -0.057** 0.027 -0.014 0.013 -0.075*** 0.025 -0.016 0.012 
Married 0.129 0.125 -0.023 0.016 0.067 0.095 -0.029* 0.015 
Child<3 -0.033 0.022 -0.018* 0.011 -0.040** 0.019 -0.023** 0.011 
Consultant physician -0.046 0.037 -0.034* 0.019 -0.075** 0.032 -0.039** 0.016 
Chief consultant phys. -0.051 0.047 -0.044 0.027 -0.085** 0.042 -0.048** 0.023 
Hospital beds 0.021*** 0.008 0.009*** 0.002 0.021*** 0.007 0.008*** 0.002 
Centr/Regional hosp -0.211*** 0.067 -0.040*** 0.013 -0.199*** 0.063 -0.040*** 0.013 
County hospital -0.112** 0.052 -0.003 0.013 -0.096** 0.046 -0.004 0.013 
Constant -0.041*** 0.010 1.316** 0.634 -0.046*** 0.008 1.340*** 0.519 
T1995   -0.047*** 0.006   -0.046*** 0.006 
T1996 -0.026 0.031 -0.107*** 0.017 -0.047 0.029 -0.113*** 0.016 
T1997 0.060*** 0.013 -0.077*** 0.018 0.061*** 0.012 -0.086*** 0.017 
AR(1) test 
(p-value) 
-3.290 
(0.001) 
-5.017 
(0.000) 
-3.509 
(0.000) 
-4.953 
(0.000) 
AR(2) test 
(p-value) 
0.638 
(0.524) 
1.583 
(0.113) 
0.354 
(0.724) 
1.413 
(0.158) 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
25.71 
(0.176) 
36.29 
(0.236) 
35.05 
(0.111) 
46.37 
(0.139) 
Observations 3038 4341 3038 4341 
Number of individuals: 1303. All results are based on a 2-step GMM. Standard errors use the Windmeijer’s finite sample correction. 
(1), (2): No additional instruments. (3), (4): Experience, length of stay, occupancy rate are used as additional instruments.  
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